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Agreement (BTA) was the culmination of a decade-long process to fully normalize diplomatic ties between Washington and Hanoi. Missteps by both sides, however, characterized the process that led to this historic accord. There was political hesitation, certainly, in both capitals to sign on to this sweeping agreement, but the greater difficulty lay within the U.S. Administration itself. Without clear direction or leadership from the White House or senior State Department officials, the U.S. Embassy was able to delay the agreement by forcing an "all or nothing" approach toward the BTA. In this policy vacuum, a small non-governmental organization --with the support of a miniscule business contingent, and a few U.S. senators --provided the impetus that helped the two sides reach a successful conclusion. The story of the Bilateral Trade Agreement -which symbolically ended one of our nation's most traumatic wars -is one of a moribund interagency process that ultimately was energized by a mere handful of players outside of the formal bureaucratic process. conservative-reformist internal debate, the BTA also threatens vested economic interests within the SRV, given that Hanoi must abandon its system of state-owned enterprises (SOE's). Chief among these interests is the People's Army of Vietnam, which, according to most estimates, generated in excess of $600 million in revenue --more than 60 percent of its annual budget --from its SOE's in 1998. Hanoi for decades) that the USTR would never achieve its ambitious goals of negotiating such a broad-based BTA. As the SRV delayed signature of the BTA, though, and agitated publicly for completing the negotiations on the remaining telecommunications aspects of the accord, the Embassy came under criticism from all quarters. Hanoi government officials used every opportunity to remind American diplomats of the need to reopen negotiations. European and other diplomats scoffed at the agreement in principle, constantly pointing out to their U.S. colleagues that they had been naïve. In this climate, according to Foote, the Embassy had no policy allies in Hanoi, and became isolated and agreed to a concession in line with the recent Chinese WTO accession talks that lowered potential U.S. equity in telecommunication enterprises from 51 percent to 49 percent, but in exchange for a significantly shorter phase-in period. The two sides negotiated a similar investment cap (and commensurately shorter phase-in period) for the insurance sector, as well. 9 The two sides negotiated
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CONCLUSION
The ultimate success of the BTA negotiations demonstrates the importance that a well-connected, informed and responsive interest group can play in the formation of foreign policy, particularly when the issue is near the periphery of U.S. interests and attention. The internal divisions within the Vietnamese government meant that Hanoi would find it difficult to muster Politburo support for the agreement, much less be a lobbying force on behalf of the BTA. On the contrary, the SRV's domestic political 9 Manyin, needs required it to criticize publicly both the agreement and Washington's motives behind it. In the absence of this bilateral support from Hanoi, a traditional U.S. Embassy response would have been to step in and interpret for Washington the political difficulties faced by the Hanoi government, pin down the scope of requested adjustments in the BTA, and work to move the negotiations back on track. Instead, because of its own increasing isolation from SRV interlocutors, the Embassy strongly advocated no new negotiations, and a "take it or leave it" approach to the agreement in principle.
The USVTC was the only actor in either the U.S. or Vietnam qualified to step into this stalemate to restart the trade talks. Through its AID-contracted work with the USTRled delegation from the beginning of the BTA negotiations, it established a knowledge base and level of confidence on both sides that was unique. The SRV viewed the USVTC as a reliable representative of USG positions, and hence a good faith negotiating partner. The Embassy, for its part, viewed the USVTC as a non-governmental actor and ultimately, therefore, was able to acquiesce to the Council's resumption of negotiations with the SRV on an exploratory basis. Finally, since almost no high-level USG officials paid attention to the BTA, the Trade Council was able to step into its negotiating role without interagency opposition. Although the unusual nature of reestablishing relations with Vietnam likely make this a model that cannot be repeated easily in other areas of foreign policy, it demonstrates both the unique role interest groups can play in policy formation, as well as the flexibility of the USG policy apparatus.
